A New Derandomization of Auctions

Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b ∈ [h]n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 − O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)] − O(h √ n ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: SAGT
• Authors: Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz
• Keywords: Aggarwal Et, Deterministic Auction, Game Theory, SAGT 2009, Single-item Auction