Language Based Secure Communication

Secure communication in distributed systems is notoriously hard to achieve due to the variety of attacks an adversary can mount, based on message interception, modification, redirection, eavesdropping or, even more subtly, on traffic analysis. In the literature on process calculi, traditional solutions to the problem either draw on low-level cryptographic primitives, as in the spi or applied-pi calculi, or rely on very abstract, and hard-to-implement, mechanisms to hide communication by means of private channels, as in the pi-calculus. A more recent line of research follows a different approach, aimed at identifying security primiequate as high-level programming abstractions, and at the same time well-suited for security analysis and verification in adversarial settings. The present paper makes a step further in that direction. We develop a calculus e communication based on core abstractions that support concise, high-level programming idioms for distributed, security-sensitive app...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: CSFW
• Authors: Michele Bugliesi, Riccardo Focardi
• Keywords: Adversarial Setting, Behavioral Equivalence, CSFW 2008, Security, Security Privacy