Abstract. Whereas encryption schemes withstanding passive chosenplaintext attacks (CPA) can be constructed based on a variety of computational assumptions, only a few assumptions are known to imply the existence of encryption schemes withstanding adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2). Towards addressing this asymmetry, we consider a weakening of the CCA2 model — bounded CCA2-security — wherein security needs only hold against adversaries that make an a-priori bounded number of queries to the decryption oracle. Regarding this notion we show (without any further assumptions): – For any polynomial q, a simple black-box construction of q-bounded IND-CCA2-secure encryption schemes, from any IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme. When instantiated with the Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption, this construction additionally yields encryption schemes with very short ciphertexts. – For any polynomial q, a (non-black box) construction of q-bounded NM-CCA2-secure encryption schemes, ...