An equal excess negotiation algorithm for coalition formation

Coalition formation is an important form of interaction in multiagent systems. It enables the agents to satisfy tasks that they would otherwise be unable to perform, or would perform with a lower efficiency. The focus of our work is on real-world application domains where we have systems inhabited by rational, self-interested, heterogeneous agents with only partial information about their environment. We also assume an environment without any trusted central manager to resolve issues concerning multiple agents. For such environments, we have to determine both an optimal coalition configuration and a stable payoff configuration, concurrently and in a distributed fashion. Solving each of these problems is known to be computationally expensive, and having to consider them together exacerbates the problem further. In this paper, we present our Progressive, Anytime, Convergent, and Time-efficient (PACT) algorithm for coalition formation to address the above concerns. We assess the stabi...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Hrishikesh J. Goradia, José M. Vidal
• Keywords: ATAL 2007, Coalition Formation, Optimal Coalition Configuration, Real-world Application Domains