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FC
2007
Springer

Informant: Detecting Sybils Using Incentives

14 years 5 months ago
Informant: Detecting Sybils Using Incentives
We propose an economic approach to Sybil attack detection. In our Informant protocol, a detective offers a reward for Sybils to reveal themselves. The detective accepts from one identity a security deposit and the name of target peer; the deposit and a reward are given to the target. We prove the optimal strategy for the informant is to play the game if and only if she is Sybil with a low opportunity cost, and the target will cooperate if and only if she is identical to the informant. Informant uses a Dutch auction to find the minimum possible reward that will reveal a Sybil attacker. Because our approach is economic, it is not limited to a specific application and does not rely on a physical device or token.
N. Boris Margolin, Brian Neil Levine
Added 07 Jun 2010
Updated 07 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where FC
Authors N. Boris Margolin, Brian Neil Levine
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