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WINE
2007
Springer

On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions

14 years 5 months ago
On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In particular we consider the fundamental case that the graph is composed of two node-disjoint s-t-paths of length s1 and s2 respectively, and prove an optimal √ s1s2 lower bound (an improvement over s1s2/2). This implies that the √ mechanism of Karlin et al. for path auctions is 2-competitive (an improvement over 2 √ 2), and is optimal if the graph is a series-parallel network. Moreover, our results extend to universally truthful randomized mechanisms as well.
Qiqi Yan
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where WINE
Authors Qiqi Yan
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