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WINE
2007
Springer

Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids

14 years 6 months ago
Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids
The choice of a bidding language is crucial in auction design in order to correctly capture bidder utilities. We propose a new bidding model for the Adwords auctions of search engine advertisement – decreasing valuation bids. This provides a richer language than the current model for advertisers to convey their preferences. Besides providing more expressivity, our bidding model has two additional advantages: It is an add-on to the standard model, and retains its simplicity of expression. Furthermore, it allows efficient algorithms – we show that the greedy (highest bid) algorithm retains its factor of 1/2 from the standard bidding model, and also provide an optimal allocation algorithm with a factor of 1-1/e (as is case in the standard bidding model). We also show how these bidding languages achieve a good trade-off between expressivity and complexity – we demonstrate a slight generalization of these models for which the greedy allocation algorithm has an arbitrarily bad compet...
Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where WINE
Authors Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta
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