Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand

For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG payments, which reduces the agents' utilities. In many settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the agents' utilities (taking payments into account). For this purpose, several VCG redistribution mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a large fraction of the VCG payments back to the agents, in a way that maintains strategy-proofness and the non-deficit property. Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. This results in a low total utility for the agents, even though the items are allocated efficiently. In this paper, we study strategyproof allocation mechanisms that do not always allo...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
• Keywords: Allocation Mechanisms, ECommerce, SIGECOM 2008, VCG Payments, Vcg Redistribution Mechanism