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JAIR
2010
100views more  JAIR 2010»
13 years 11 months ago
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multiunit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appro...
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
14 years 11 days ago
On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...
Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
220views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
14 years 11 days ago
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer