Computational Probabilistic Non-interference

In recent times information flow and non-interference have become very popular concepts for expressing both integrity and privacy properties. We present the first general definition of probabilistic non-interference in reactive systems which includes a computational case. This case is essential to cope with real cryptography since non-interference properties can usually only be guaranteed if the underlying cryptographic primitives have not been broken. This might happen, but only with negligible probability. Furthermore, our definition links non-interference with the common approach of simulatability that modern cryptography often uses. We show that our definition is maintained under simulatability, which allows secure composition of systems, and we present a general strategy how cryptographic primitives can be included in information flow proofs. As le we present an abstract specification and a possible implementation of a cryptographic firewall guarding two honest users from their en...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2002
• Where: ESORICS
• Authors: Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann
• Keywords: Cryptographic Firewall, Cryptographic Primitives, ESORICS 2002, Information Flow Proofs, Security Privacy