Peer-to-peer environments have become popular as a framework for exchange of services. In these environments, certain peers may fail to provide their services. Reputation can be a proper means of discovering low-performing peers, without affecting significantly inherent characteristics of Peer-to-Peer environments, such as anonymity and privacy. However, the accurate calculation of the reputation metrics may not be sufficient to provide the right incentives to peers. In this paper, we show that the straightforward approach for peers to exploit the reputation metrics (i.e. by just selecting as a providing peer the one with the highest reputation) may lead to unexpectedly low efficiency for high-performing peers. We argue and justify experimentally that the calculation of the reputation values has to be complemented by reputation-based policies that define the pairs of peers eligible to interact. We introduce two orthogonal dimensions constituting the reputationbased policies: "pro...
Thanasis G. Papaioannou, George D. Stamoulis