Efficient Spectrum Leasing via Randomized Silencing of Secondary Users

In this paper, a primary (licensed) user leases part of its resources to independent secondary (unlicensed) terminals in exchange for a tariff in dollars per bit, under the constraint that secondary transmissions do not cause excessive interference at the primary receiver (PRX). The PRX selects a power allocation (PA) for the secondary user that maximizes the secondary rate (and thus its revenue) and enforces it by the following mechanism: Upon violation of a predefined interference level, PRX keeps silencing randomly selected secondary users, until the aggregate secondary interference is below the required threshold. This mechanism ensures that secondary users may not be willing to deviate from the allocated PA. Specifically, the scenario gives rise to a Stackelberg game, in which the primary determines the PA and a Nash equilibrium (NE) constraint is imposed on the PA to ensure that secondary users do not have incentives to deviate, given their knowledge of the silencing mechanism ru...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: TWC
• Authors: Rocco Di Taranto, Petar Popovski, Osvaldo Simeone, Hiroyuki Yomo
• Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Channel Gains, Power Allocations, Secondary Users, TWC 2010