A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values

We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upperbound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
• Keywords: ATAL 2003, Auction Protocol, Double Auction Protocol, GTPD Protocol, Intelligent Agents