Modelling Multilateral Negotiation in Linear Logic

Abstract. We show how to embed a framework for multilateral negotiation, in which a group of agents implement a sequence of deals concerning the exchange of a number of resources, into linear logic. In this model, multisets of goods, allocations of resources, preferences of agents, and deals are all modelled as formulas of linear logic. Whether or not a proposed deal is rational, given the preferences of the agents concerned, reduces to a question of provability, as does the question of whether there exists a sequence of deals leading to an allocation with certain desirable properties, such as maximising social welfare. Thus, linear logic provides a formal basis for modelling convergence properties in distributed resource allocation.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: ECAI
• Authors: Daniele Porello, Ulle Endriss
• Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Deals, ECAI 2010, Linear Logic, Multilateral Negotiation