A Probabilistic Poly-Time Framework for Protocol Analysis

We develop a framework for analyzing security protocols in which protocol adversaries may be arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time processes. In this framework, protocols are written in a restricted form of }-calculus and security may expressed as a form or observational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language theory that involves quantifying over possible environments that might interact with the protocol. Using an asymptotic notion of probabilistic equivalence, we relate observational equivalence to polynomial-time statistical tests and discuss some example protocols to illustrate the potential strengths of our approach.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 1998
• Where: CCS
• Authors: Patrick Lincoln, John C. Mitchell, Mark Mitchell, Andre Scedrov
• Keywords: Arbitrary Probabilistic Polynomial-time, CCS 1998, Observational Equivalence, Polynomial-time Statistical Tests, Security Privacy