Secure Computation Without Authentication

In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of parties wish to jointly compute some function of their inputs. Such a computation must preserve certain security properties, like privacy and correctness, even if some of the participating parties or an external adversary collude to attack the honest parties. Until this paper, all protocols for general secure computation assumed that the parties can communicate reliably via authenticated channels. In this paper, we consider the feasibility of secure computation without any setup assumption. We consider a completely unauthenticated setting, where all messages sent by the parties may be tampered with and modified by the adversary (without the honest parties being able to detect this fact). In this model, it is not possible to achieve the same level of security as in the authenticated-channel setting. Nevertheless, we show that meaningful security guarantees can be provided. In particular, we define a relaxed notion of what it me...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: CRYPTO
• Authors: Boaz Barak, Ran Canetti, Yehuda Lindell, Rafael Pass, Tal Rabin
• Keywords: CRYPTO 2005, Honest Parties, Secure Computation, Secure Multiparty Computation