A Security Model for Anonymous Credential Systems

This paper proposes a formal model of the Bellare-Rogaway type [1] that enables one to prove the security of an anonymous credential system in a complexity theoretic framework. The model abstracts away from how a specific instance of anonymous credential system achieves its goals; instead it defines what these goals are. The notions of credential unforgeability, non-transferability, pseudonym unlinkability and pseudonym owner protection are formally defined and the relationships between them are explored. The model is a step towards a formal treatment of the level of privacy protection that anonymous credential systems can and should achieve, both in terms of pseudonym unlinkability and user anonymity.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: IFIP11
• Authors: Andreas Pashalidis, Chris J. Mitchell
• Keywords: Anonymous Credential Systems, Business, Credential, IFIP11 2004, Pseudonym Unlinkability