Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: DAGSTUHL
• Authors: Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings
• Keywords: DAGSTUHL 2006, DAGSTUHL 2007, Individual Auction Parameters, Reserve Price, Shill Bidding