Traffic Analysis against Low-Latency Anonymity Networks Using Available Bandwidth Estimation

Abstract. We introduce a novel remotely-mounted attack that can expose the network identity of an anonymous client, hidden service, and anonymizing proxies. To achieve this, we employ single-end controlled available bandwidth estimation tools and a colluding network entity that can modulate the traffic destined for the victim. To expose the circuit including the source, we inject a number of short or one large burst of traffic. Although timing attacks have been successful against anonymity networks, they require either a Global Adversary or the compromise of substantial number of anonymity nodes. Our technique does not require compromise of, or collaboration with, any such entity. To validate our attack, we performed a series of experiments using different network conditions and locations for the adversaries on both controlled and real-world Tor circuits. Our results demonstrate that our attack is successful in controlled environments. In real-world scenarios, even an under-provisioned...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: ESORICS
• Authors: Sambuddho Chakravarty, Angelos Stavrou, Angelos D. Keromytis
• Keywords: Anonymity Networks, Controlled Available Bandwidth, ESORICS 2010, Real-world Tor Circuits, Security Privacy