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AAAI
2004
13 years 8 months ago
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions
Recent algorithms provide powerful solutions to the problem of determining cost-minimizing (or revenue-maximizing) allocations of items in combinatorial auctions. However, in many...
Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields
IJCAI
2007
13 years 8 months ago
Sequential Bundle-Bid Single-Sale Auction Algorithms for Decentralized Control
We study auction-like algorithms for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. To reduce the team cost of sequential single-item auction algorithms, we generalize...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Xiaoming Zheng, Ilgaz...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 18 days ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
FOCS
2008
IEEE
13 years 8 months ago
On the Approximability of Budgeted Allocations and Improved Lower Bounds for Submodular Welfare Maximization and GAP
In this paper we consider the following maximum budgeted allocation (MBA) problem: Given a set of m indivisible items and n agents; each agent i willing to pay bij on item j and w...
Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Gagan Goel
CAEPIA
2003
Springer
14 years 18 days ago
Negotiation Support in Highly-Constrained Trading Scenarios
Abstract. Negotiation events in industrial procurement involving multiple, highly customisable goods pose serious challenges to buyers when trying to determine the best set of prov...
Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, Antonio Reyes-Mo...