In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and ...
In this paper, we prove lower bounds on the competitive ratio of randomized algorithms for two on-line problems: the k-server problem, suggested by [MMS], and an on-line motion-pl...
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
We consider packet scheduling in a network providing differentiated services, where each packet is assigned a value. We study various queueing models for supporting QoS (Quality ...