Agents often want to protect private information, while at the same acting upon the information. These two desires are in conflict, and this conflict can be modeled in strategic...
This article, assuming that player motivations are the outcome of continuous player-environment interactions, applies the needs framework of Murray (1938) to a computer game and i...
Abstract. Weighted voting games are a popular model of collaboration in multiagent systems. In such games, each agent has a weight (intuitively corresponding to resources he can co...
Edith Elkind, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Nicholas R. J...
In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechan...
We study mechanisms that can be modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities, and apply ideas from mechanism design and game theory to problems arising in a network d...