We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the co...
We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of...
The Full-Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme [3] forms one the most basic usages of random oracles. It works with a family F of trapdoor permutations (TDP), where the signature of m...
Yevgeniy Dodis, Roberto Oliveira, Krzysztof Pietrz...
We describe CoSP, a general framework for conducting computational soundness proofs of symbolic models and for embedding these proofs into formal calculi. CoSP considers arbitrary...
Verifiably encrypted signature schemes (VES) allow a signer to encrypt his or her signature under the public key of a trusted third party, while maintaining public signature verifi...