The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative versi...
Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisa...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelev...
We present new deterministic and probabilistic algorithms that reduce the factorization of dense polynomials from several to one variable. The deterministic algorithm runs in sub-...
With the current trend toward multicore architectures, improved execution performance can no longer be obtained via traditional single-thread instruction level parallelism (ILP), ...