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ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
Automated design of scoring rules by learning from examples
Scoring rules are a broad and concisely-representable class of voting rules which includes, for example, Plurality and Borda. Our main result asserts that the class of scoring rul...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosensc...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
Yoram Bachrach
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
128views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 10 months ago
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the ...
Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 10 months ago
Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability
Recent applications of game theory in security domains use algorithms to solve a Stackelberg model, in which one player (the leader) first commits to a mixed strategy and then th...
Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr