Coalition Logic does not explicitly talk about the effects of a coalitional move on the strategic ability of the remaining players, while in Game Theory reasoning patterns involvi...
Paolo Turrini, Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Ju...
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to measure inconsistencies in ontologies based on Shapley values, which are originally proposed for game theory. This measure c...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
The problems of contextual equivalence and approximation are studied for the third-order fragment of Idealized Algol with iteration (IA∗ 3). They are approached via a combination...
This paper presents HYRIWYG (How You Rate Influences What You Get), a reputation system applicable to Internet Recommendation Systems (RS). The novelty lies in the incentive mecha...
Ana Cristina Bicharra Garcia, Martin Ekstrom, Hans...