Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
The focus of this chapter is on the Gen...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
– In this paper, we propose an auction mechanism for routing in mobile ad hoc networks with selfish nodes. Our approach is to promote bidding for end-to-end routes, as opposed to...
Auctions are a well-established mechanism for efficient allocation of scarce resources and as such have already become a standard approach for pricing QoS-enabled future Internet ...