We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter that describes how ties in head-to-head contests...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying/selling multiple objects. These two mechanisms yield different outcomes (i.e., different revenues and a...
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
A key trend in (electronic) commerce is a demand for higher levels of expressiveness in the mechanisms that mediate interactions. We develop a theory that ties the expressiveness ...
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable resource allocation in multiagent systems. This paper focusses on monotone cooperative games, a class which ...