We develop new proof techniques, based on non-interference, for the analysis of safety and liveness properties of cryptographic protocols expressed as terms of the process algebra ...
—An attacker that can identify messages as coming from the same source, can use this information to build up a picture of targets’ behaviour, and so, threaten their privacy. In...
Myrto Arapinis, Tom Chothia, Eike Ritter, Mark Rya...
To protect privacy in large systems, users must be able to authenticate against a central server without disclosing their identity to the network. Private identification protocols ...
We expose the vulnerability of an emerging wireless ranging technology, impulse radio ultra-wide band (IR-UWB), to distance-decreasing attacks on the physical communication layer ...
Manuel Flury, Marcin Poturalski, Panos Papadimitra...
Cryptographic protocols can only be secure under certain inequality assumptions. Axiomatizing these inequalities explicitly is problematic: stating too many inequalities may impair...