The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative versi...
Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisa...
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple win...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
The firmware of an electronic voting machine is typically treated as a “trusted” component of the system. Consequently, it is misconstrued to be vulnerable only to an insider...
Seda Davtyan, Sotiris Kentros, Aggelos Kiayias, La...
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change t...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hem...