In this paper we present an advanced bidding agent that participates in first-price sealed bid auctions to allocate advertising space on BluScreen – an experimental public adve...
Alex Rogers, Esther David, Terry R. Payne, Nichola...
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high ...
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tu...