The choice of a bidding language is crucial in auction design in order to correctly capture bidder utilities. We propose a new bidding model for the Adwords auctions of search eng...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
We present a decentralized, asynchronous market protocol for allocating and scheduling tasks among agents that contend for scarce resources, constrained by a hierarchical task dep...
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...