Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tu...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
This paper presents a new negotiation mechanism and a new supplier model for Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management(TAC SCM). Under the new negotiation mechanism, an ag...
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
Abstract. In this paper we initiate an exploration of relationships between “preference elicitation”, a learning-style problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the pr...
Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, M...