We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
Auctions are useful mechanism for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders’ valuations for ite...
Digital archives protect important data collections from failures by making multiple copies at other archives, so that there are always several good copies of a collection. In a c...
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when ...
Sushil Bikhchandani, Sven de Vries, James Schummer...
Abstract. This paper presents an iterative, highly parallelizable approach to find good tours for very large instances of the Euclidian version of the well-known Traveling Salesma...