We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
The functional characteristics of market-based solutions are typically best observed through the medium of simulation, data-gathering and subsequent visualization. We previously d...
Peter Gradwell, Michel A. Oey, Reinier J. Timmer, ...
Online auctions are rapidly becoming one of the significant forms of electronic commerce for buying and selling goods and services. A good understanding of the workload of auctio...
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...