We consider the problem of resource allocation and scheduling where information and decisions are decentralized, and our goal is to propose a market mechanism that allows resource...
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high ...
We investigate the problem of matching buyers and sellers in a multi-item multi-unit combinatorial exchange so as to maximize either the surplus (revenue minus cost) or the tradin...
We study auction-like algorithms for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. To reduce the team cost of sequential single-item auction algorithms, we generalize...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Xiaoming Zheng, Ilgaz...