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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 3 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
CEC
2011
IEEE
12 years 10 months ago
Trainer selection strategies for coevolving rank predictors
—Despite the range of applications and successes of evolutionary algorithms, expensive fitness computations often form a critical performance bottleneck. A preferred method of r...
Daniel L. Ly, Hod Lipson
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 3 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
WINE
2005
Springer
161views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 3 months ago
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari
CEC
2010
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Many-objective Distinct Candidates Optimization using Differential Evolution on centrifugal pump design problems
Many-objective problems are difficult to solve using conventional multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) as these algorithms rely primarily on Pareto ranking to guide the ...
Peter Dueholm Justesen, Rasmus K. Ursem