Endowing agents with “social rationality” [10, 12, 11] can aid overall efficiency in tasks where cooperation is beneficial to system level performance. However it is difficult...
Abstract. In social mechanism design, obligation distribution creates individual or contractual obligations that imply a collective obligation. A distinguishing feature from group ...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...
In this paper, we describe a novel bidding strategy that autonomous trading agents can use to participate in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy is based on both short...
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Dave Cliff, Nicholas R. J...
Today's computer network technologies are sociologically founded on hunter-gatherer principles; common users may be possible subjects of surveillance and sophisticated Interne...