67 search results - page 9 / 14 » Characterizing Truthful Market Design |
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2003
IEEE
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 8 months ago
2008
ACM
Prediction markets efficiently extract and aggregate the private information held by individuals about events and facts that can be publicly verified. However, facts such as the e...
ICCV
2009
IEEE
15 years 1 months ago
2009
IEEE
This paper investigates the design of a system for recognizing
objects in 3D point clouds of urban environments.
The system is decomposed into four steps: locating, segmenting,
...
ICPP
2008
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
2008
IEEE
We design an incentive-compatible mechanism for scheduling n non-malleable parallel jobs on a parallel system comprising m identical processors. Each job is owned by a selfish us...