This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...
Establishing trust amongst agents is of central importance to the development of well-functioning multi-agent systems. For example, the anonymity of transactions on the Internet c...
We study the problem of designing a mechanism to rank items in forums by making use of the user reviews such as thumb and star ratings. We compare mechanisms where forum users rat...
Anish Das Sarma, Atish Das Sarma, Sreenivas Gollap...
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...