We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...
We design an incentive-compatible mechanism for scheduling n non-malleable parallel jobs on a parallel system comprising m identical processors. Each job is owned by a selfish us...
Incentive mechanisms are essential components of peer-topeer systems for file sharing such as BitTorrent, since they enforce peers to share their resources and to participate. Re...
Thomas Silverston, Olivier Fourmaux, Jon Crowcroft
Abstract. We experimentally studied the effects of a eBay-style selfreporting reputation mechanism in an double-sided exchange economy in which participants have the option of not...
This paper proposes a packet partition scheduling mechanism for bandwidth aggregation over end-to-end multi-path through multiple network interfaces. The proposed mechanism effect...