Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions

We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give a deterministic truthful mechanism, when the valuations are single-minded: when R is a collection of fat objects (respectively, axis-aligned rectangles) in the plane, there is a truthful mechanism with a 1 + - (respectively, log n )approximation of the social welfare (where n is an upper bound on the maximum integral coordinate of each rectangle). We also consider the non-single-minded case, and design a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism with approximation guarantee O(1) (respectively, O(log m)).

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2010
• Where: WINE
• Authors: George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz
• Keywords: Deterministic Truthful Mechanism, Economy, Randomized Truthful-in-expectation Mechanism, Truthful Mechanism, WINE 2010