As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
We study an update operator for Coalition Logic to talk about the way players' strategic ability changes because of the moves of their opponents. We show its connection with D...
Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, ...
The role of explicit feedback in learning has been studied from a variety of perspectives and in many contexts. In this paper, we examine the impact of the specificity of feedback ...
Matthew Hays, H. Chad Lane, Daniel Auerbach, Mark ...
The game of Monopoly® is a turn-based game of chance with a substantial element of skill. Though much of the outcome of any single game is determined by the rolling of dice, an ef...
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...