In this paper we consider the following maximum budgeted allocation (MBA) problem: Given a set of m indivisible items and n agents; each agent i willing to pay bij on item j and w...
Combinatorial auctions have recently attracted the interest of many researchers due to their promising applications such as the spectrum auctions recently held by the FCC. In a com...
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for obj...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...