Scoring rules are a broad and concisely-representable class of voting rules which includes, for example, Plurality and Borda. Our main result asserts that the class of scoring rul...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosensc...
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
We present a study on various statistics relevant to research on color constancy. Many of these analyses could not have been done before simply because a large database for color ...
Rational decision making requires full knowledge of the utility function of the person affected by the decisions. However, in many cases, the task of acquiring such knowledge is n...
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...