This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
This paper presents a new negotiation mechanism and a new supplier model for Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management(TAC SCM). Under the new negotiation mechanism, an ag...
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auc...
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, N...