We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple win...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
In many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model ...
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...