In normal scenarios, computer scientists often consider the number of states in a game to capture the difficulty of learning an equilibrium. However, players do not see games in ...
We describe algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in structured game representations, including both graphical games and multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The algorithms...
We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he/she buys) and an init...
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...
Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. ...
We study Congestion Games with non-increasing cost functions (Cost Sharing Games) from a complexity perspective and resolve their computational hardness, which has been an open que...