We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better ...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
The revelation principle is a cornerstone tool in mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention, without loss in the designer’s objective, to mechanisms in which A...
In this paper we consider the problem of designing load balancing protocols in distributed systems where the participants (e.g. computers, users) are capable of manipulating the l...
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
The complexity of current computing networks and the required fluidity of their operation requires autonomy to be central to the design and implementation of a managed overlay net...
Dominic Jones, John Keeney, David Lewis, Declan O'...