We investigate equilibrium strategies for bidding agents that participate in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. For this setting, previous rese...
Enrico H. Gerding, Zinovi Rabinovich, Andrew Byde,...
We describe an algorithm for computing bestresponse strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents...
We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [2], where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is...
We study algorithmic questions concerning a basic microeconomic congestion game in which there is a single provider that offers a service to a set of potential customers. Each cus...
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that player...